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Abstract
In the UK electricity market generators are obliged to produce a certain amount of their electricity
with renewable energy resources in accordance with the Renewable Obligation Order. This obligation
comes with an (indirect) subsidy rewarding firms with tradable green certificates for their renewable
energy production. Until 2009 every unit production of renewable energy was rewarded with the same
amount of certificates. Since 2009 a banding has been added to the Renewable Order, meaning that
different technologies are rewarded with a different number of certificates. The obligation then shifted
from one on production to one on certificates. This paper discusses and analyzes these two different
renewable obligation policies in a mathematical framework. The policies are modeled into a two-stage
electricity market investment model in which firms invest at the first stage and produce at the second
stage. Since banding may result in an outcome where the original obligation target is not satisfied, hence
potentially resulting in more pollution, we present an alternative banding policy. We provide revenue
adequate pricing schemes for the three obligation policies in order to guarantee that the regulator can
cover the payments to firms owning certificates with the mark-ups paid by consumers. Then we move
to a stochastic framework where the two main sources of uncertainty are the availability of renewable
generation output and the stochastic nature of electricity demand. The stochastic framework is used to
carry out a simulation study via sampling on a small network representing the UK market. We analyze
the effects of the three obligation policies; a key finding is that, indeed, the UK banding policy cannot
guarantee that the original obligation target is met. Our alternative provides a way to make sure that
the target is met while supporting less established technologies, but it comes with a significantly higher
consumer price. Furthermore, we observe a concerning side effect of banding policies, as a cost reduction
in a technology with a high banding (namely offshore wind) leads to more CO2 emissions under the UK
banding policy and to higher consumer prices under the alternative banding policy.
Keywords: investment modeling in electricity markets, energy policy, renewable energy obligations,
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1 Introduction
In decentralized electricity markets, firms are mainly focussed on maximizing their profits while com-
peting with other firms. Investments in cheap and often polluting technologies tend to serve these goals
well. This is in conflict with the goals set by governments as they aim at reducing pollution and want
therefore to create incentives to make investments in cleaner technologies more attractive. Charging
firms for their carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions through either taxation or a cap-and-trade system in
which firms need to buy emission permits, are two possible actions regulators can implement to make
production with polluting technologies more expensive and therefore financially less attractive. Instead
of charging firms for their emissions, governments may also hand out subsidies to firms for producing
with clean technologies. That way investments in renewable technologies, which usually come with very
high investment costs, become profitable. One can make a distinction between direct subsidies (usually
in the form of Feed-in Tariffs) and indirect subsidies. In this paper we discuss the latter in more detail.
An indirect subsidy is usually given in the form of a renewable obligation. In several US states and
in European countries like Belgium, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Italy, and UK, a renewable obligation is
in effect.1 The renewable obligation is a target on the proportion of electricity that should come from
renewable resources and is set by the regulator on one group of operators in the market. Usually the
obligation is imposed on consumption, through electricity sellers. In Italy however, the obligation is on the
generators. So-called green certificates are used to show compliance to the target, and typically one such
certificate represents 1 MWh of renewable electricity production. At the end of each obligation period,
often a year, each seller or producer should submit a certain number of certificates to the regulator. When
not satisfying the target, typically a buy-out fine has to be paid. The latter comes with an opportunity
cost that puts a value on each certificate, which forms the price a seller is willing to pay to a renewable
generator. The reward that generators receive adds to the short-term profits in a way that high long-
term investment costs can be covered. Certificates can also be traded on a secondary market and as a
consequence the renewable obligation does not oblige individual generators to produce a certain part of
their electricity generation with renewable resources.
The UK and Italy form an exception to the system where one certificate represents 1 MWh of
renewable electricity. In these countries certificates are banded according to technology, meaning that for
different (renewable) technologies a different number of certificates is handed out per MWh of production.
These so-called banding systems in the UK and Italy can help in encouraging investments in less developed
technologies as to make them more competitive in the long run. This way it can overcome one of
1For overviews of different support mechanisms across Europe, see Fouquet and Johansson (2008) and Koster et al. (2011).
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the shortcomings of the regular renewable obligation which is known to single out the most developed
technologies, namely onshore wind power and to a lesser extent landfill gas (see Meyer (2003), Wood
and Dow (2011), and Verbruggen and Lauber (2012)). Although these technologies may be financially
attractive, due to all kind of geographical constraints and opposition against onshore wind farms it is
unlikely that the renewable obligation target can be met in the long run without investments in other
renewable technologies like offshore wind, as emphasized by Toke (2011) and Wood and Dow (2011).
In this paper we investigate the effects of imposing a renewable obligation and introducing tradable
green certificates. In particular, we focus on the (original) obligation system in the UK and take a
closer look at their banding system in a mathematical and analytical framework. In order to analyze the
system we extend the two stage investment model as introduced in Gürkan et al. (2012) by incorporating
renewable obligations. In the mathematical model, investments are considered long-term decisions (for
example yearly) which take place at the first stage. Production, transmission, and market clearing are
short-term decisions (for example hourly or daily) that take place in the spot market, referred to as
the second stage, which can be repeated several times. We assume perfect competition at both stages
meaning that firms are price takers.
In order to make our model a good representation of reality and to keep results analytically tractable,
we will make two simplifying assumptions with respect to the UK system. First of all, as mentioned
earlier, in the UK the renewable obligation is imposed on total electricity sales. We assume though, that
the firms producing power are selling their power directly to consumers, meaning that the obligation
will be on electricity production. The second simplifying assumption concerns the trading of certificates.
Recall that in the original obligation system each MWh of renewable energy production is rewarded with
one renewable certificate. At the end of each period (typically a year) generators should submit a certain
number of certificates proportional to the total production to show the obligation is met. In reality, the
certificates can be traded daily on a secondary market and will have a certain value determined by the
short term demand for certificates. Trading would be done on a daily basis and result in day to day
variations in the value of a certificate. We overlook the micro details of the secondary trading market
and therefore ignore the daily trading possibilities. Instead, we consider the average certificate value that
holds over the year, which is directly related to the yearly obligation target. This average value is the
reward the regulator pays firms per certificate. At the same time the consumer price is regulated in the
form of a mark-up, as to cover the certificate payments.
After modeling the original renewable obligation into a mathematical framework, we take a closer look
at the banding system that was introduced in the UK in 2009.2 Under the banding policy, production with
different renewable technologies is rewarded with a different number of certificates. As a consequence,
some model adjustments need to be done; that is, we replace the obligation on production by one on
certificates, and modify the pricing scheme defining the prices paid for production with non-renewable
2For a description of the UK (banding) system, see Constable and Barfoot (2008) and Clark (2008).
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and renewable production and the consumer price. We analyze the consequences of the new policy and
argue that the system can be effective in giving incentives to invest in less established technologies, but
as an undesirable side effect may result in a more polluting mixture of technologies.
As a potential remedy for this negative side effect, we propose an alternative banding policy. In this
alternative, production with different renewable technologies will be rewarded with a different amount of
certificates in the same way as in the UK banding system. However, the obligation will be on renewable
production rather than on certificates, similar to how it is done in the Italian banding system.3 Different
from the Italian banding system, in which the regulator buys excess certificates, we make a modification
to the reward per certificate in order to guarantee that rewards paid to firms are covered by mark ups
paid by consumers, that is, to guarantee revenue adequacy for the regulator.
We then analyze the original obligation system, the UK banding system, and our proposed alternative
in a numerical study where we assume uncertain demand and uncertain generation output of renewable
resources. We focus on a small network with two non-renewable technologies (coal and combined cycle
gas turbine (CCGT)) and three renewable technologies (onshore wind (ONW), offshore wind (OFFW),
and landfill gas (LFG)) and obtain investment quantities, prices, and CO2 emissions in all three systems.
A key observation in all three systems is that the higher the obligation target, the more coal is replaced
not only by renewable technologies, but also by CCGT which acts as a peak technology in case of high
demand and/or low wind output. That way CO2 emissions are curbed both by the increased renewable
capacity and by the replacement of coal by the cleaner CCGT. Introducing the UK banding system has
the effect of giving incentives for investments in OFFW, which were not present in the original system.
However, bandings fail to create the right incentives when the obligation target is set too low. In that case
the UK banding system may result in a cleaner mixture (but without OFFW) and overshoot the original
target on production. On the other hand, when there are incentives to invest in OFFW we observe that
for high obligation targets on certificates, the original target on production will not be satisfied. Hence,
the UK banding system may lead to a more polluting technology mixture. Furthermore we observe that
consumer prices in the UK banding system are not affected by having the more expensive OFFW in
the mixture. Comparing the UK system to our alternative, we observe that the alternative needs higher
obligation targets in order to create incentives for OFFW investments. When the obligation target is
high enough for OFFW to be in the optimal mixture, we observe that consumer prices increase and
exceed those obtained in the other systems.
Finally we analyze the effect of a decrease in the investment cost of OFFW. We find that investments
are very sensitive to such a cost reduction and that under both banding policies there will be more
OFFW in the system. Interestingly, although the investment quantities change, consumer prices in the
UK banding system and CO2 emissions in the alternative banding system remain unchanged. On the
other hand, we observe a significant increase in consumer prices in the alternative system and considerably
3For a description of the Italian system, see Giovannetti (2009).
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increased levels of CO2 emissions in the UK banding system.
To summarize, the key findings in this paper are: First, the UK banding system may result in higher
levels of CO2 emissions compared to the original obligation system when OFFW is in the technology
mixture; the alternative banding system proposes a possible solution for this undesirable side effect,
albeit with relatively higher and less stable consumer prices. Second, cost reductions in a technology
with high bandings (that is, OFFW), lead to increased levels of CO2 emissions in the UK banding system
and increased consumer prices in the alternative system. These are obviously negative side effects of
banding systems, implying that as costs reduce, financial support and hence bandings should be reduced
accordingly.
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the basic electricity market investment model in
Section 2 and expand this model to include the renewable obligation in Section 3. In Section 4 we
introduce the concept of bandings. We explain the details of the UK banding system and propose an
alternative system. In Section 5 we introduce uncertainty into the models. Both the generation output
of renewable resources and electricity demand will be uncertain. The numerical study is carried out in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Electricity Market Investment Model
In this section we introduce the electricity market investment model. Given is an electricity grid with
supply nodes at which firms owning generation plants produce electricity using their technologies that
are renewable or non-renewable, and demand nodes at which consumers with, by assumption, inelastic
demand are located. Supply and demand nodes are connected by means of transmission lines with a given
capacity, forming a network. Typically, when power is transmitted from one node to another through
a transmission line, flows in the entire network are affected; furthermore, electricity cannot be stored.
Firms at supply nodes make decisions in two stages. At the first stage all firms simultaneously maximize
their profits while determining their optimal production capacity. Their profits are dependent on the
equilibrium outcome at the second stage, which in return is dependent on the investment decisions of all
firms at the first stage. The equilibrium at the second stage is between firms maximizing their profits
while producing electricity given their production capacity in the first stage, a transmission system
operator (TSO) owning the transmission grid, who is maximizing its own profits and taking care of
the flows between supply and demand nodes, and subject to two types of market clearing conditions,
an imposed price cap when there is unsatisfied demand, and a condition guaranteeing that demand is
satisfied in all nodes. We assume perfect competition, and hence at both stages firms are not aware of
the fact that they can influence prices. Since at the market equilibrium investment decisions of firms
(indirectly) depend on decisions of other firms, we have a two stage game between the firms. When the
first stage is solved to optimality and the second stage is at equilibrium, for none of the entities it is
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profitable to deviate and thus a perfectly competitive equilibrium is obtained.
A suitable mathematical framework for the two-stage game is presented in Gürkan et al. (2012). They
model the electricity market in a two-stage setting and show that under perfect competition the resulting
two-stage game can be written as a single optimization problem when everything is deterministic, or as
a standard two stage stochastic program in case of (demand) uncertainty at the second stage. In Gürkan
et al. (2013) the same model is used for analyzing the consequences of imposing a taxation per unit
emission or a cap-and-trade system. The latter means that firms have to buy permits on a secondary
market in order to emit CO2 and thus pay for their emissions. Instead of charging firms for their emissions,
we will analyze the effects of imposing an indirect subsidy in the form of a renewable obligation, which
will be the subject of Section 3. Before imposing the obligation, we provide an overview of the electricity
market investment model as formulated in Gürkan et al. (2012) and Gürkan et al. (2013).
We make two adjustments to those models. First of all, for simplicity we assume that each firm has
its own technology and is operational at all supply nodes (but not necessarily producing) for notational
convenience. Second, we explicitly distinguish between a set of non-renewable technologies and a set of
renewable technologies. The sets, parameters, and variables are given below.
Sets:
N : the set of demand nodes
I : the set of supply nodes
KN : the set of non-renewable technologies
KR : the set of renewable technologies
K : the set of all technologies (K := KN ∪KR)
L : the set of electricity transmission lines connecting nodes in the network.
Parameters:
cik : unit production cost at supply node i ∈ I for technology k ∈ K
κik : unit investment cost at supply node i ∈ I for technology k ∈ K
dn : demand at demand node n ∈ N
MRk : ceiling on investments in renewable technology k ∈ KR
PTDFl,j : power transmitted through line l ∈ L due to one unit of power injection
into node j ∈ N ∪ I
hl : capacity limit of line l ∈ L
V OLL : value of unserved energy or lost load.
Variables:
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xik : generation capacity investment in technology k ∈ K at supply node i ∈ I
yik : quantity of power generated at supply node i ∈ I
by using technology k ∈ K
fj : net power flow dispatched by the TSO to node j ∈ N ∪ I
δj : unserved demand at node j ∈ N ∪ I
pcj : electricity price at node j ∈ N ∪ I
pNik : price non-renewable technology k ∈ KN at supply node i ∈ I gets per unit sold
pRik : price renewable technology k ∈ KR at supply node i ∈ I gets per unit sold.
In the remainder of the paper, variables may get superscripts N and R depending on their corre-
sponding technology in KN and KR, respectively. In addition, for k ∈ K we define xk = (xik)i∈I and
yk = (yik)i∈I , the vectors containing investments and production, respectively, of technology k ∈ K in
all supply nodes.
We next formulate the first and second stage problems. At the first stage each firm k ∈ K determines
its optimal investment quantities xk in all supply nodes, in order to maximize the optimal second stage
profit minus the investment cost. The optimal second stage profit of technology k ∈ K at supply node
i ∈ I is the price pik minus production cost cik, times the optimal second stage production yik as a
function of investments xk. Unit investment costs for technology k ∈ K in supply node i ∈ I are κik.















k ) is the optimal production quantity of technology k at supply node i ∈ I at the second stage.
Since firms are assumed to be price takers, for i ∈ I, pNik is taken as a parameter. pNik is typically equal
to the consumer price in node i, pci , but depending on the pricing scheme p
N
ik may be altered when for
example an additional fee for a certificate or permit has to be paid. For a renewable generator k ∈ KR













Again, for i ∈ I, yRik(xRk ) is the optimal production quantity of technology k at supply node i at the
second stage and pRik is taken as a parameter. Again, typically p
R
ik is equal to p
c
i , but depending on the
pricing scheme it may be altered. As we will see in the next section, introducing a renewable obligation
may result in a difference between pN and pR. In addition, there can be a ceiling on capacity investments
due to for example regulation or physical limitations. This is typical for some renewable technologies like
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landfill gas. Hence, we add the following constraint that should be satisfied for technology k ∈ KR:
∑
i∈I
xRik ≤ MRk (ζRk ), (3)
where ζRk is the nonnegative dual price associated with the ceiling. We provide an interpretation of this
dual price at the end of this section.
At the second stage each firm determines its optimal production quantities while maximizing its
second stage profit, subject to the capacity constraint. The investment quantities from the first stage are
given and treated as parameters. For each renewable technology k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I we define
Fik(·) as some differentiable possibly nonlinear (stochastic) nondecreasing function of the investment xRik,
with Fik(0) = 0, denoting the available capacity. For example, Fik(·) can be Fik(x) =
√
x in which case
the available capacity is deterministic and known in advance, or one can have Fik(x, ω) = θik(ω)x, where
θik(ω) ∼ uniform( 12 ,1). Parameter θik then represents the fraction of capacity in technology k at node
i that is available. In general Fik(·) should reflect the fact that for most renewable resources like wind
power, not all installed capacity is available for generation at all times. We discuss this in more detail in
Section 5. The second stage problem for a non-renewable generator k ∈ KN is
ΠNk (x
N






s.t. yNik ≤ xNik (βNik) ∀i ∈ I
yNik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
(4)
For a renewable generator k ∈ KR we have:
ΠRk (x
R






s.t. yRik ≤ Fik(xRik) (βRik) ∀i ∈ I
yRik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I.
(5)
The βs are the dual variables associated with the capacity constraints and represent the scarcity rents.
The produced electricity is transmitted from the supply nodes to the demand nodes by the Trans-
mission System Operator (TSO). The TSO determines the optimal net flow fj into node j ∈ N ∪ I.
Having fj < 0 means there is a flow out of node j (which usually holds for the supply nodes). Power
is transmitted through transmission lines l ∈ L. Each line in L runs from one node to another node.
Each flow affects the capacities on all lines in the network either positively or negatively in accordance
with Kirchhoff’s Law; see for example Chao et al. (2000). Kirchhoff’s Law is taken into account via the
commonly used power transmission distribution factors (PTDF), which are given for a given network.
For the network flows to be feasible, it must hold that the net load on line l ∈ L must lie between the
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PTDFl,jfj ≥ 0 (λ−l ) ∀l ∈ L.
(6)
The first constraint is the flow balance constraint with dual price ρ, and the last two constraints take
care of the transmission capacity on the lines l ∈ L and have dual prices λ+l and λ
−
l , respectively.
Finally, two market clearing conditions should hold at equilibrium. First, in each supply node i ∈ I,
where the demand is defined as di = 0, the flow out of this node can be at most equal to the total
production in that node. In each demand node n ∈ N , where the supply is defined as yNnk = 0 ∀k ∈ KN
and yRnk = 0 ∀k ∈ KR, the flow into this node should be at least equal to the demand dn (unless there
is unsatisfied demand as we explain below). Perpendicular to those conditions, the market price pcj in
each node j ∈ N ∪ I is determined. Second, there may be unsatisfied demand at node j ∈ N ∪ I which
we denote by δj . Whenever the unsatisfied demand is positive, the market price in node j should be set
to VOLL, the Value Of Lost Load, or to a high price-cap. In other words, VOLL can essentially serve as
a price-cap and is in general taken as a high number, compared to regular electricity prices. The above







yRjk + δj + fj − dj ⊥ pcj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I
0 ≤ V OLL− pcj ⊥ δj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(7)
The second stage problem now consists of the firms’ problems (4) and (5), the TSO’s problem (6), and
the two types of market clearing conditions (7). After specifying the prices pN and pR in relation to
pc in each node, the entire second stage can be written as a single optimization problem, the Optimal
Power Flow (OPF) problem, as shown in Gürkan et al. (2012). Solving the OPF problem results in an
equilibrium at the second stage. This will be further discussed in the next section.
Given an equilibrium at the second stage, firms determine their first stage investment quantities
based on the information from the second stage. In order to establish the connection between the two
stages we write the KKT-optimality conditions that need to be solved for first stage optimality. The
KKT-optimality conditions of the first stage problem given by (1) are:
0 ≤ xNik ⊥ −βNik + κNik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN (8)
These conditions follow from writing the Lagrangian function of (1) and taking derivatives with respect
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to xNik, i ∈ I, k ∈ KN . A detailed derivation of these first stage conditions can be found in Gürkan et al.
(2012). For every i ∈ I, k ∈ KN , at least one of the two sides in (8) should hold with equality, and hence
there can only be a positive investment in technology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I if the corresponding





can now be interpreted as the value of an additional unit investment in technology k ∈ KN in supply
node i ∈ I.
The KKT-optimality conditions of the first stage problem given by (2) and (3) are:
0 ≤ xRik ⊥ −F ′ik(xRik)βRik + κRik + ζRk ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
0 ≤ ζRk ⊥ MRk −
∑
i∈I
xRik ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ KR.
(9)
These conditions follow from writing the Lagrangian function of (2) subject to (3), and taking derivatives
with respect to xRik, i ∈ I, k ∈ KR and ζRk , k ∈ KR. The first condition means that at least one of
the two sides should hold with equality and hence there can only be a positive investment in technology
k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I if F ′ik(xRik)βRik covers the sum of the investment cost κRik and the dual price
associated with the ceiling ζRk . β
R










the scarcity rent of a unit investment. ζRk can be seen as the additional scarcity rent that comes with
the ceiling, MRk . When the ceiling becomes binding, another, more expensive technology will be used to
satisfy demand. As a consequence prices and hence scarcity rents increase with the additional rent ζRk .
The second condition in (9) guarantees that ζRk is zero whenever the ceiling is not binding.
Finally, we analyze the equilibrium to the two stage game (1)-(7). The following theorem summarizes
its key properties.
Theorem 2.1. Consider the two-stage optimization problem defined by (1)-(7). At the equilibrium, the
following holds.
For investment in non-renewable technology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I to be positive, it must hold that
• p∗Nik − cNik = κNik
• β∗Nik = κNik
• y∗Nik = x∗Nik
For investment in renewable technology k ∈ KR in supply node i ∈ I to be positive, it must hold that
• F ′ik(xRik)(p∗Rik − cRik) = κRik + ζ∗Rk
• F ′ik(xRik)β∗Rik = κRik + ζ∗Rk
• y∗Rik = Fik(x∗Rik )
Proof: Suppose investment in non-renewable technology k ∈ KN in supply node i ∈ I is positive, that is,
x∗Nik > 0. If p
∗N
ik − cNik < κNik, by y∗Nik ≤ x∗Nik firm k has a negative first stage profit in supply node i and is
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better off with no investments. On the other hand, if p∗Nik −cNik > κNik, firm k’s investment goes to infinity
and hence we have no equilibrium. Hence, p∗Nik − cNik = κNik. β∗Nik = κNik follows immediately from (8) and











which contradicts our previous statement. The proof for renewable technology k ∈ KR is similar and is
omitted. 




ik − cRik) = κRik + ζ∗Rk can be interpreted as follows. On the left hand side, p∗Rik − cRik
is the net marginal revenue of production, and taking the derivative of production with respect to invest-
ment gives us the net marginal revenue of investment. At the equilibrium, this net marginal revenue of
investment should be equal to the right hand side, which is the net marginal cost of investment including
the additional scarcity rent for investment in case (3) is binding.
In the absence of environmental regulation to encourage investments in renewable technologies, both
the price for non-renewable technologies and for renewable technologies are typically set at the consumer
price. Together with the results in Theorem 2.1, this implies the following. In each supply node i ∈ I
only a single technology, namely the one with the lowest sum of per unit production and investment cost,
has a positive investment. The consumer price and hence the price for all technologies in node i ∈ I will
be set equal to this sum. In reality, whenever there is a non-renewable technology available in a node,
none of the renewable technologies will have a positive investment because of its high investment cost.
However, given that we can have different prices for both non-renewable and renewable technologies, we
can incorporate some regulation that will set the price for renewable technologies higher as to create a
financial incentive for investment in some k ∈ KR to be positive. We do this in the next section by
introducing a renewable obligation that comes with a reward for producing with renewable technologies.
3 Introducing a Renewable Obligation and Tradable Green
Certificates
We introduce a renewable obligation target in the electricity market investment model that was intro-
duced in the previous section. An obligation target, denoted by ϕ, is set by the regulator. ϕ ∈ [0, 1] is












yRik be the total production using non-renewable and renewable
plants, respectively. Given the obligation target it should hold that
Y R
Y R + Y N
≥ ϕ. (10)
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Production with renewable resources is in general more expensive (when considering both investment and
production cost) than production with non-renewable resources. The obligation (10) forces producers to
replace non-renewable production with renewable production and thus comes with a certain additional
cost. We let ν be the cost incurred with a unit increase of renewable production. More specifically, ν can
be seen as the dual variable to (10) and represents the mark-up renewable generators should get in order
to increase their production by one unit. These mark-ups are given to the firms through certificates.
For each unit production, a renewable certificate is obtained and ν should thus be the value of such a
certificate. Certificates can either be traded on a secondary market, or sold to the regulator to show
compliance to the obligation. When trading is considered, ν would be the fair price for each certificate.
When, like we assume, the regulator rewards firms for owning certificates, ν is the reward per certificate
firms get paid at the end of each period, typically a year. ν is thus referred to as the certificate price
(from the regulator’s perspective) or reward (from the firm’s perspective). Rewriting (10) with ν as its




(1− ϕ)Y Rk −
∑
k∈KN
ϕY Nk ⊥ ν ≥ 0, (11)
where Y Rk :=
∑
i∈I
yRik for k ∈ KR and Y Nk :=
∑
i∈I
yNik for k ∈ KN . These aggregate variables per technology
will be used in the remainder of the paper to simplify notation.
We next consider the effect of rewards on the nodal prices. The electricity price in each supply node is
usually set by the technology that produces with the highest marginal production cost. Since the fuel cost
and hence the unit production cost (as opposed to the unit investment cost) of renewable technologies
will in general be very low, without loss of generality we can assume that the electricity price will be set
by a non-renewable technology. We refer to this price as the base price in node i ∈ I and denote it by
pNi . When power is bought from a non-renewable generator k ∈ KN , the price paid per unit thus equals
pNik = p
N
i . When a renewable generator k ∈ KR sells power, it sells both the power (at price pNi ) to the
consumer and the certificate (at price ν) to the regulator, and should therefore be paid pRik = p
N
i + ν.
In electricity markets consumers typically pay a fixed consumer price that is independent of the
resource. If consumers would only pay the electricity price pNi in every node i, the rewards paid to the
firms could not be covered. The regulator therefore regulates the consumer price and adds a mark-up on
top of pNi . The mark-up is set in such a way that the additional income covers the rewards paid to firms
for owning certificates (that is, to guarantee revenue adequacy). Since a part ϕ of the total production
should come from renewable resources, given that the total production equals Y (= Y N + Y R), the total
renewable production should be ϕY . This is also the number of times a reward should be paid to the
firms. Hence, the mark-ups for the consumer price should cover ϕY ν. Furthermore, we want the mark-up
to be equal in each node i; that is, although the electricity price can be different in each node due to the
network structure, the certificate price and thus the mark-up are the result of putting a constraint on
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the entire market and hence should not be different for different nodes. Assuming that all the produced
power will be sold, it should hold that the mark-up ∆pc is the solution of ∆pcY = ϕY ν, resulting in a
consumer price equal to pci = p
N
i + ϕν, i ∈ I. This is imposed in the following pricing scheme:
pNik = p
N
i ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
pRik = p
N
i + ν ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
pci = p
N
i + ϕν ∀i ∈ I.
(12)
Given this pricing scheme, we can express both pNik and p
R
ik in (4) and (5) in terms of p
c
i ; that is,
pNik = p
c
i − ϕν for k ∈ KN and pRik = pci + (1− ϕ)ν for k ∈ KR. We show that with this pricing scheme a
solution for the entire second stage problem can be obtained by solving an Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
problem. First, let us write the KKT conditions of the second stage problems (4), (5), (6), and the
market clearing conditions (7) for given x:
0 ≤ β∗Nik − p∗ci + ϕν∗ + cNik ⊥ y∗Nik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
0 ≤ β∗Rik − p∗ci − (1− ϕ)ν∗ + cRik ⊥ y∗Rik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
0 ≤ xNik − y∗Nik ⊥ β∗Nik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
0 ≤ Fik(xRik)− y∗Rik ⊥ β∗Rik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
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s.t. yNik ≤ xNik (βNik) ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN














ϕyNik ≥ 0 (ν)∑
j∈N∪I
fj = 0 (ρ)∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,jfj ≤ hl (λ+l ) ∀l ∈ L∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,jfj ≥ −hl (λ−l ) ∀l ∈ L
yNik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
yRik ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
δj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(14)
A solution (y∗, δ∗, f∗) of the OPF problem satisfies KKT-conditions (13) for some β∗, p∗c, ν∗, ρ∗, λ∗+,
λ∗−. More details on the derivation for the base case model can be found in Boucher and Smeers (2001)
and Gürkan et al. (2012); ours is a straight forward extension. Solving the OPF problem gives a second
stage equilibrium for given x. The entire investment problem can now be solved by finding an equilibrium
to the second stage problem (14) together with the first stage optimality conditions consisting of (8) and
(9).
In Theorem 2.1 we gave properties of x∗, y∗, p∗, and β∗ at the equilibrium. Given the pricing scheme
(12), we can now replace the prices and analyze the equilibrium in case of a renewable obligation. Recall
that for a non-renewable technology k ∈ KN to have positive investments in supply node i ∈ I it should







ik , k ∈ KN , i ∈ I. Only one non-renewable technology will have a positive
investment and will thus set the price for non-renewable technologies. For a renewable technology k ∈ KR
to have positive investments in supply node i ∈ I, it must hold that F ′ik(xRik)(p∗Rik − cRik) = κRik + ζ∗Rk ;










k )− (1− ϕ)ν∗. (15)













to the obligation, ν∗ will now be set such that at least a fraction ϕ will be produced with renewable
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technologies, and hence at least one renewable technology must have a positive investment. Depending
on the caps on investment quantities MRk , k ∈ KR, multiple renewable technologies can be in the
equilibrium mixture. All capacity of the cheapest renewable technology (in terms of the sum of their
production and investment cost), let’s say k0 ∈ KR, would be used up first. If that is not sufficient
to satisfy the obligation, k0 would invest up to his maximum capacity and ζ∗Rk0 would become positive.
The next cheapest renewable technology will be used and as such the consumer price in node i, p∗ci , will
increase. ζ∗Rk0 will be determined such that the equality in (15) for technology k
0 still holds and can thus
be seen as the additional rent for investment in technology k0 due to the ceiling.
Since only the cheapest firms invest at the equilibrium, the deterministic equilibrium can simply be
based on all the parameters and is thus quite straightforward. In reality, broader mixtures of technologies
are used, which is the result of daily uncertainties like demand and weather fluctuations. We therefore
continue our analysis of the effects of the renewable obligation in Sections 5 and 6 where we deal with
a stochastic version of the model and carry out a numerical study. Before doing so, we first extend
the renewable obligation to the case in which different renewable technologies are eligible for a different
number of certificates per unit production.
4 Introducing a Banding System
The previously introduced model was applicable to the UK system until the 1st of April 2009, when the
Renewable Obligation Order 2009 became effective.4 In this regulatory document a banding system was
added to the renewable obligation. In the old system, a unit production with a renewable technology was
eligible for one renewable energy certificate and hence would receive the certificate price for each unit
production. In the new system, renewable certificates are banded according to technology. This means
that different renewable technologies are eligible for a different number of certificates. The main reason
for introducing bandings is to encourage investments in less established technologies (by giving them
more certificates per unit production). The original renewable obligation failed to give the right financial
incentives as it tended to mainly benefit onshore wind power and landfill gas, as noted by Meyer (2003).
As argued by Toke (2011) and Wood and Dow (2011), investments in these more established technologies
are limited not by the lack of financial incentives, but mostly because of landscape protection, public
opposition, and space. Therefore, investment in less developed technologies will be necessary in order to
be able to achieve the ambitious renewable energy targets.
In the new system onshore wind is used as the reference for bandings. A unit production with onshore
wind is rewarded with one certificate, less established technologies like offshore wind and geothermal are
rewarded with 1.5 and 2 certificates, respectively, and more established technologies like sewage gas and
landfill gas are rewarded with only 0.5 and 0.25 certificates, respectively. The regulator may change
4See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/785/contents/made?view=plain.
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these coefficients from time to time when a different support is desirable. This has recently been done
for offshore wind, which now will get 2 certificates per unit production until 2014.
In this section we first incorporate the UK banding system into the existing model. We introduce
a pricing scheme and analyze the advantages and drawbacks of the new system. Then we propose an
alternative that is closer to the Italian banding system in order to overcome some of these drawbacks.
4.1 The UK Banding System
With the banding system as introduced in the UK, the obligation shifts from one on the renewable
production to one that is expressed as the number of certificates that should be presented by the entire
market at the end of each period. Hence, with the new system, obligation constraint (11) should be






k −R ⊥ ν ≥ 0, (16)
where R is the number of certificates all firms together have to present, and αk is the number of certificates
firm k ∈ KR receives for producing one unit of electricity with renewable technology k ∈ KR.
As explained in great detail in the Renewable Obligation Order 2009, in order to determine R, the UK
regulator performs two calculations estimating the number of certificates that should or can potentially
be issued. Whichever calculation gives the highest estimate will be set as the obligation target R. The
first calculation, Calculation A, is based on a fixed target representing the number of certificates firms
should produce per unit of electricity produced. This target is in fact the original obligation target ϕ
that was used in system (11). The total number of certificates that should be issued based on this fixed
target is simply ϕ times the expected total electricity production and will be defined as A.
In the second calculation, Calculation B, the number of certificates that is likely to be issued, given
the existing renewable production capacity and the expected new built capacity, is estimated. In addition
a headroom of 8% is added. The outcome is defined as B.
In practice this means that if A > B, it is expected that the existing and expected new built capacity
will not be sufficient to reach the original obligation target ϕ that was used for Calculation A. Hence,
the target is set at A to oblige firms to install additional renewable capacity. If B > A, it means that
there is already sufficient existing plus expected new built capacity in the system. When this happens,
the original target ϕ may be met quite easily and as a consequence the value of certificates may drop to
zero, resulting in an unfavorable situation for the renewable generators. Setting the obligation target at
B should avoid this. In order to provide even more security and to give extra incentives, an additional
headroom of 8% is added to the originally computed expected number of certificates that is likely to be
issued.
After the target R = max{A,B} is determined, the regulator obliges all firms to produce a certain
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number of certificates per unit production. If A > B, each firm will need to submit ϕ certificates per
unit production. If B > A each firm will have to submit ϕB = ϕA
B
certificates per unit production. Since
we assume perfect competition and deal with certificates that can be traded on a secondary market,
this obligation per firm can also be seen as one for the entire market. We let ϕUK be the target on
certificates based on the calculations above (either ϕ or ϕB), which means that R, the total number of
certificates that should be presented, equals ϕUK times the total production. Hence, replacing R in (16),




(αk − ϕUK)Y Rk −
∑
k∈KN
ϕUKY Nk ⊥ ν ≥ 0. (17)
Since different technologies are rewarded with a different number of certificates, prices paid to the
generators will depend on the technology used. Therefore we will have to adjust the pricing scheme
(12) introduced under the original renewable obligation. Per unit production in any supply node i ∈ I,
a renewable technology k ∈ KR is given αk certificates. Since, when selling the electricity, firms also
sell their certificates, renewable technology k ∈ KR is then paid the base price, pNi , plus αk times
the certificate price ν. In the corresponding pricing scheme we get that pNik = p
N
i , k ∈ KN , i ∈ I and
pRik = p
N
i +αkν, k ∈ KR, i ∈ I. With a consumer price similar to the one in (12), namely pci = pNi +ϕUKν,
i ∈ I, it turns out that mark ups paid by consumers equal the rewards paid to firms for owning certificates.





k , which by (17) equals νϕ
UKY . It can easily be
seen that νϕUKY is the total mark ups paid by consumers, and hence rewards paid to firms are covered.
This means the pricing scheme is revenue adequate. Summarizing, the adjusted pricing scheme for the
UK banding system becomes
pNik = p
N
i ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
pRik = p
N




UKν ∀i ∈ I.
(18)
Note that ideally it would hold that, with the obligation on certificates, a fraction ϕUK of the total
production comes from renewable resources like in the old obligation system. However, since there is no
one-to-one relationship between renewable production and certificates anymore, this is not necessarily the
case. In case a major part of the obligation is satisfied by a technology with a high banding coefficient,
the actual renewable production may be (much) lower than the desired target on production and as a
consequence the banding system could result in a more polluting mixture of technologies. In general,
Calculation B may set the target on certificates a bit higher than the original obligation ϕ, but when
there are technologies with a high banding coefficient, one may not guarantee that the original target on
renewable production is met unless the target on certificates is increased accordingly.
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We will come back on this issue in our numerical study. In the next section, we propose an alternative
system that combines features of the original obligation and the UK banding system.
4.2 An Alternative Banding System
As the UK banding system does not necessarily guarantee that the obligation target on renewable pro-
duction (11) is satisfied and may even result in a more polluting mixture, we propose an alternative
banding system. Unlike in the UK banding system where the obligation shifted to one on certificates,
the obligation will be imposed on production in the same way it was done in the original renewable
obligation (that is, as in (11) as opposed to (17)). On the other hand, certificates will still be handed
out based on the pre-specified banding coefficients. Since in this case we no longer have a one-to-one
correspondence between a unit of renewable production and a certificate, and since the target is no longer
on certificates like in the UK banding system, the dual price ν in (11) no longer represents the value of
a certificate; it just represents the value of a unit production with a renewable resource. This will have
a consequence for the reward per certificate and hence for the pricing scheme.
As we have seen, under the previously discussed obligation policies consumers pay a mark-up that
covers the rewards the regulator pays to the firms for owning certificates; in other words, the proposed
pricing schemes are revenue adequate for the regulator. We would like this revenue adequacy to hold in
the alternative system as well. In the UK banding system, in the pricing scheme (18), the consumer price
was set at pci = p
N
i + ϕν. We adopt this price in our alternative system as this price does not depend on
the αks and hence on the technologies used, which is typically the case in electricity markets. With this








 = ν ∑
k∈KR
Y Rk .
The latter equality holds by (11); that is, either ν = 0 or the left hand side inequality in (11) holds with






k . Therefore, instead of ν, we are going to pay firms an adjusted certificate price ν̃, which











As mentioned above, due to the different interpretation of ν in (11), such an adjustment was not necessary
in the UK banding system. In the investment model we incorporate the above condition as the following
equality that will have to hold at the second stage:
∑
k∈KR
(ν̃αk − ν)Y Rk = 0. (19)
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The resulting pricing scheme then becomes
pNik = p
N
i ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KN
pRik = p
N
i + αkν̃ ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ KR
pci = p
N
i + ϕν ∀i ∈ I.
(20)
It can easily be seen with (11) and (19) that this new scheme is revenue adequate for the alternative
banding system.
Although this alternative system guarantees that the original obligation target on production is
satisfied, there are a few drawbacks to this system. First of all, the price of a certificate is no longer
determined by the secondary trading market. The regulator has to intervene and buy certificates from
firms at an adjusted price that is influenced by both the technology mixture and the mark-ups paid
by consumers. The intervention in the trading process is likely to come with a certain administrative
burden. Second, as we will see in more detail in our numerical study, the consumer price is much more
sensitive to the technology mixture and in particular is higher when a large share of the production is
done with a technology with a banding coefficient higher than 1. Furthermore, the consumer price could
even increase as a result of a cost reduction (due to for example innovation) of a technology; this, we
do not observe in the UK banding system. However, as we will show in our numerical study, in the UK
banding system cost reductions can potentially lead to more polluting technology mixtures.
5 Introducing Uncertainty
The previously introduced models all assume a deterministic world. In reality however, demand can be
uncertain due to seasonality and daily changes in, for example, weather patterns, and also the output
of renewable power plants may vary from day to day, hour to hour. For example wind turbines are
depending on daily weather conditions and influenced by the actual wind speed. A unit investment in
wind energy does not mean we can produce a given amount of power at all times. We refer to this
uncertainty as the uncertainty in availability of capacity.
The way we deal with uncertainty can be explained as follows. At the first stage, only the under-
lying probability distributions (which can be simply based on past empirical data) of the demand and
availability of capacity are known; firms have to make decisions on their optimal investment quantities
without knowing the outcome of the random variables. At the second stage the realizations are revealed
to the firms. When firms make their first stage decision, they view the second stage as a short-run
process that repeats itself over and over again. Each realization of the random variable can for example
be seen as the realization associated with a particular day (or even an hour). On every day of the year
there is an outcome, and the first stage decision is taken at the beginning of the year. Hence, the first
19
stage decision is a long-term decision. When making the decision, we take either the expectation or the
sample average (in case we use a sampling technique) over all days and determine the investment level
based on the expected or sample averaged second stage outcome.
When moving to the stochastic setting, a couple of modifications to the proposed models are needed.
First, consider the basic two-stage model consisting of the first stage problem consisting of (1), (2), and (3)
and the second stage problems (4), (5), (6), and (7). At the first stage, we assume the available renewable
capacity at the second stage and the second stage demand to be unknown to the firms. At the second
stage, ω will be a vector containing the uncertainties in available capacities and demand. Outcomes of
the associated random variables are assumed to be revealed to firms at the second stage. To incorporate
uncertain availability of capacity, for k ∈ KR, i ∈ I we define Fik(x, ω) as some differentiable random
function of the investment amount x of technology k in supply node i. For given ω we call Fik(x, ω)
the realized available capacity in technology k ∈ KR in node i ∈ I. Uncertain demand in demand node
n ∈ N is denoted by dn(ω). At the first stage, given the probability distributions (or historical data)
of the random variables at the second stage, long-term profits are maximized and the corresponding
optimal investment quantities are determined. Long-term profits now consist of the expected second




































xRik ≤ MRk (ζRk ).
(22)
The second stage for given x and ω is given by the OPF problem (14) with ω attached to all variables,
d, and F , and without the fourth constraint that deals with the renewable obligation. The renewable
obligation constraint is instead going to be imposed as a first stage constraint, as we explain below. For
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yRjk(ω) + δj(ω) + fj(ω) ≥ dj(ω) (pcj(ω)) ∀j ∈ N ∪ I∑
j∈N∪I
fj(ω) = 0 (ρ(ω))∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,jfj(ω) ≤ hl (λ+l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L∑
j∈N∪I
PTDFl,jfj(ω) ≥ −hl (λ−l (ω)) ∀l ∈ L
yNik(ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ K
N
yRik(ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ K
R
δj(ω) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ N ∪ I.
(23)
The stochastic version of the basic model now consists of (21) for all k ∈ KN and (22) for all
k ∈ KR at the first stage and (23) for all ω ∈ Ω at the second stage.
When introducing a renewable obligation and a banding system, we need to make a few
adjustments to the basic model. In all three systems, we replace the second stage obligation by
its stochastic equivalent that is going to be imposed ex-ante, on the expected (or in numerical
experiments sample-averaged) yearly production. This means that from day to day the obligation
may be violated, but (in expectation) the end of the year target should be met. As such, we
are interested in the ex-ante certificate price which depends on the underlying distribution (or
historical data) of the random variable, but is fixed over the year. Notably, we replace (11), (17),
and (19) with (24), (25), and (26), respectively; see below.
In principle, it is possible to consider a daily obligation as an alternative. The obligation
should then be a second stage constraint (omitting the expectation) and each day (that is, in
each realization) there could be a different certificate price. This implies that the certificate price
will be fluctuating over the days. In this paper, we focus on having the obligation constraint over
a certain period, since this is what is applied in reality (see for example Bertoldi and Huld (2006)
and Van der Linden et al. (2005)).
In addition to replacing the obligation, we also need to adjust the pricing schemes (12), (18),
and (20) in the original obligation system, the UK banding system, and the alternative banding
system, respectively. We simply add ωs to the prices. With these modified pricing schemes, in
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expectation the mark-ups paid by consumers cover the rewards. However, due to the uncertain
outcome at the second stage, ex-post there may exist gaps between daily rewards to be paid and
daily income from mark-ups. Focusing on such situations in more detail may be interesting for
regulators aiming at daily revenue adequacy; however, it is outside the scope of this paper.
Finally, as a consequence of moving the obligation from the second to the first stage problem,
in each of the systems the objective function of the OPF problem (23) needs a modification. All
the necessary modifications to the obligation and the objective function of (23) are summarized
below.
• No banding:









⊥ ν ≥ 0. (24)














(cRik − (1− ϕ)ν)y
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⊥ ν ≥ 0. (25)



















– Replace (11) at the second stage by the first stage condition (24).




(ν̃αk − ν)Y Rk (ω)
]
= 0. (26)
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To analyze these models, we carry out a numerical study in the next section, where we use
sampling to deal with the uncertainty. We take M random samples from the given probability
distributions. Then, each realization is denoted by ωm, m = 1, ...,M , and for each of these real-
izations the second stage problem is solved. At the first stage we then deal with the expectations
by taking sample averages over all realizations.
6 Numerical Study
In this section we analyze the effects of the different renewable obligation systems on investments,
prices, and CO2 emissions in a numerical framework. In order to keep things tractable and
solvable in a reasonable amount of time, we consider a small system. The setting is rigorously
simplified in terms of network effects, but nonetheless we can draw some conclusions about
possible side effects of the systems and make a comparison between them.
We are going to focus on three different renewable obligation policies:
• No banding: There is no banding mechanism, meaning all αks for renewable technologies
are equal to 1.
• UK banding: The banding mechanism that is currently applied in the UK is imposed,
under the assumption that Calculation A sets the target; the obligation is expressed as the
number of certificates per MWh of power produced.
• Alternative banding: The banding mechanism as proposed in Section 4.2 is imposed; the
obligation is expressed as the amount of power that should come from a renewable resource
per MWh of power produced, and rewards are adjusted in order to guarantee long term
revenue adequacy.
First, for different target levels we depict investments, prices, and CO2 emissions in order to
analyze the effects of the different systems and to get insight in their advantages and disadvan-
tages. Second, it is reasonable to expect that after a technology is given support, more innovation
and development will take place and subsequently that investment costs decrease. We therefore
analyze the effects of a cost reduction of one of the technologies in the second part of this section.
We consider a single node and hence assume there is no limited network capacity on the
transmission lines. For a thorough analysis of investment under uncertainty in transmission
capacity in the UK electricity market, we refer to Van der Weijde and Hobbs (2012). We instead
focus on the direct effects of obligation policies in absence of network limitations. We consider five
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firms, each having a unique technology at their disposal. Non-renewable technologies coal and
closed cycle gas turbine (CCGT) are used by firms 1 and 2, respectively. Renewable technologies
onshore wind (ONW), offshore wind (OFFW), and landfill gas (LFG), are used by firms 3, 4,
and 5, respectively. In addition there are two demand nodes, nodes 6 and 7. Table 1 contains the
characteristics of the technologies, consisting of per unit production costs (ck), investment costs
(κk), tons of CO2 emission per unit production (ek), and the banding coefficient (αk). The CO2
Table 1: Characteristics of the technologies.
Coal CCGT ONW OFFW LFG
ck 22.1 50.2 0 0 21.1
κk 30.24 12.96 25.62 53.48 24.78
ek 1 0.35 0 0 0.2
αk 0 0 1 2 0.25
emission per unit production, ek, is given to indicate how polluting the technologies are. The
cost figures are in Pounds and based on data in MottMacDonald (2010). It is quite common in
numerical studies to work with levelized cost of investment; that is, the investment cost that is
needed to produce 1 MWh of electricity, taking into account that not every MW installed will be
available at all times. We ignore this when defining the investment costs that play a role at the
first stage, and will thus work with the real investment cost that is involved with having 1 MW
of capacity installed. The fact that not all installed capacity is available for the full 8760 hours
in the year is taken into account at the second stage via the function F (·) that we specify below.
Demand dn(ω) in demand nodes n = 6, 7 are independent and are sampled from uniform
distributions with lower bound an and upper bound bn as in Table 2.




The available wind and landfill gas capacities are also randomly distributed. As a function
representing the realized available capacity of technology k we take Fk(x, ω) = θk(ω)x, where
for each renewable technology θk(ω) is sampled from a uniform distribution with lower bound
ak and upper bound bk, k = 3, 4, 5, as in Table 3. We assume onshore and offshore wind are
fully correlated, but assume independence between wind and landfill gas realizations. We chose
uniform distributions out of sheer convenience; one can choose alternatives which may fit the
empirical data closely or even use empirical data itself.
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Finally, as investment in landfills in the UK is limited by law, we impose a maximum invest-
ment in LFG of 5 units. We take a sample of size 3000.
6.1 Effects of Varying the Obligation Target
In this section we compare the three obligation systems in terms of investment quantities, prices,
and CO2 emissions for various obligation targets; that is, we let the obligation target range from
0 to 0.5 with increments of 0.01.































Figure 1: Investment quantities in the no banding system.
In Figures 1, 2, and 3 the effects of an increasing obligation target ϕ on investments are
depicted. In Figure 1 the original obligation system without bandings is imposed. For low levels
of ϕ we see that LFG is the only renewable technology in the mixture. As soon as it reaches
its maximum capacity of 5 at ϕ = 0.12, investments in ONW begin. There are no financial
incentives to invest in OFFW (though in reality there may actually be investments in OFFW
for other reasons than profit maximization, like geographic and regulatory constraints limiting
onshore wind power). Investments in coal are decreasing with ϕ, but for the other conventional
technology, CCGT, we observe a slight increase as ϕ increases. From our numerical output data we
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Figure 2: Investment quantities in the UK banding system.































Figure 3: Investment quantities in the alternative banding system.
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conclude that CCGT acts as a peak load technology, as it is mainly used for producing electricity
in cases of high demand and/or low wind. More investment in ONW leads to more intermittency
in the system. Consequently, to deal with the growing intermittency, more investment in the peak
load technology, CCGT, will be done. Since investment in CCGT is cheaper than investment in
coal, CCGT is preferred as a peak load technology. In the literature it is also often argued or even
assumed that CCGT and gas in general are suitable technologies for dealing with intermittency
due to its low capital cost and relatively fast start-up times (see for example DeCarolis and Keith
(2006), Strbac (2002), Strbac et al. (2007)). Concluding, one can say that the obligation reduces
CO2 emissions in two ways: directly, via the replacement of coal by ONW, and indirectly, via
the replacement of coal by the cleaner CCGT.
In Figure 2 investments under the UK banding system are depicted. We observe three major
differences compared to Figure 1. First of all, for low levels of ϕUK , there are no investments
in ONW in the original obligation system (Figure 1). However, in the UK banding system both
LFG and ONW are in the mixture. This is caused by the fact that firms have to satisfy a target
expressed in certificates and LFG is only rewarded with 0.25 certificates per unit production.
Secondly, we observe positive investments in OFFW for high levels of ϕUK . Starting from ϕUK =
0.33, we see a trade off between ONW and OFFW investments. From the fact that OFFW is not
in the optimal mixture until ϕUK = 0.33, we can conclude that for the UK banding system to
be effective in encouraging investments in OFFW one needs rather high target levels. In general
one can conclude that the UK banding system is certainly not effective in giving incentives to
invest in OFFW for all target levels. A third observation is that, as OFFW investments increase,
there is no need for additional CCGT investments like we observed in Figure 1. This is due to
the fact that OFFW is more reliable than ONW. As a consequence, investments in coal decrease
less rapidly when OFFW is in the mixture.
Investments under the alternative banding system are depicted in Figure 3. For lower levels of
ϕ we observe less investments in renewables than in the UK banding system, but about as much
as in the original obligation system. A more obvious observation is that investment in OFFW
begins at ϕ = 0.41, which is much later than in the UK banding system (Figure 2). Hence,
the alternative system needs higher obligation targets in order to succeed in giving financial
incentives to invest in OFFW. The reason for this difference is the contribution of OFFW to
satisfying the obligation target. In the UK system a unit production with OFFW is rewarded
with 2 certificates and hence contributes to the target on certificates twice as much as ONW.
In the alternative system a unit production with OFFW only contributes one unit to satisfying
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the target on renewable production. Hence, OFFW only enters the mixture when it has a cost
advantage over ONW due to the higher bandings. In addition it appears that once OFFW has this
cost advantage and is in the mixture, investments will increase more rapidly with ϕ compared
to the UK banding system in which OFFW is mainly in the mixture to satisfy the target on
certificates.
































Figure 4: The certificate price ν in the no banding and UK banding systems, and the adjusted certificate
price ν̃ in the alternative banding system.
In Figure 4 the certificate prices are shown. For the original obligation system and the UK
banding system we use the certificate price ν, while for the alternative banding system we use
the adjusted certificate price ν̃. Hence, what we observe in the figure is the rewards firms get per
certificate. In general the certificate price is set in such a way as to make renewable technolo-
gies competitive compared to nonrenewable technologies (and eventually other renewables). We
observe that without bandings and for ϕ up to 0.11, the certificate price can be low since LFG
is relatively cheap. For higher ϕ and in the banding systems, ONW and OFFW are needed to
satisfy the target and hence ν has to increase in order to make those technologies competitive.
Since the production and investment costs in all three systems are the same, the reward needed
for making a technology competitive is almost the same. Furthermore, it can be seen that the
curves are relatively insensitive to changes in ϕ for ϕ > 0.11. This can be explained by the fact
that once the adequate level of ν is reached, there is no need for a higher reward.
Figure 5 shows the average consumer prices. Since we have different prices in each realization
we look at the average price, p̄c, over all realizations. As consumers pay pc = pN + ϕν with ν
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Figure 5: The average consumer price.
relatively constant with respect to ϕ, as we saw in Figure 4, it is not surprising that in all three
systems the average consumer price is increasing with ϕ. In the no banding system, the average
price makes a jump when ϕ moves from 0.11 to 0.12, which is caused by the fact that ONW
came into the mixture. In the UK banding system, there is no such jump, since ONW is in the
optimal mixture also for low values of ϕ. From the figure we may conclude that going from the
original obligation system to the UK banding system does not necessarily increase prices. Other
than in the lower regions, the average prices in the no banding and UK banding systems are
almost equal, meaning that the additional financial incentive given to OFFW in the form of a
relatively high banding does not affect consumer prices. In the alternative banding system prices
are in general lower than or equal to the prices in the other two systems, except for very high
levels of ϕ (ϕ ≥ 0.45). Hence, in the alternative system the financial incentive given to OFFW
does result in higher (average) consumer prices. This is caused by the fact that the reward per
certificate will remain the same as we observed in Figure 4, while the total number of certificates
significantly increases due to the larger amount of OFFW in the mixture. This is reflected in the
consumer prices.
The realized renewable production as fractions of total production in the three scenarios are
depicted in Figure 6. By the way the obligation was imposed in both the no banding and the
alternative banding system the fraction will automatically be equal to ϕ, meaning that the target
is actually satisfied. In the UK banding system, as long as only LFG and ONW are in the
mixture, we are overshooting the target. However, for high levels of ϕ the original target on
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Figure 6: The renewable production as a fraction of total production.
renewable production would be violated due to the increased amount of OFFW production. As
a unit production with OFFW contributes two units to satisfying the target on certificates, less
total renewable production is needed to satisfy this target.




























Figure 7: The average CO2 emissions.
In Figure 7 the average CO2 emissions over all realizations are depicted. We see that, as one
would expect, CO2 emissions are decreasing with ϕ. Under the UK banding policy, for low and
medium levels of ϕ there is less emission than in the other systems, because of the higher fraction
of renewable production (as observed in Figure 6). This is mainly the case when OFFW is not
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in the optimal mixture. However, for higher levels of ϕ, when a significant amount of OFFW is
in the mixture, we observe that the UK banding system leads to higher levels of CO2 emission
compared to the other systems.
To summarize, a renewable obligation leads to more financial incentives for investments in
renewable resources. When OFFW is given more support in the form of a higher banding, for
relatively high obligation levels this support becomes effective. However, this may come at the
cost of more CO2 emissions in the UK banding system and significantly higher consumer prices
in the alternative banding system.
6.2 Sensitivity to Decreasing Investment Costs
One goal of a banding system is to encourage development in less established technologies like
offshore wind power. As technologies get more established, investment costs are likely to go down
in the long run (learning by doing). We now assume that due to the extra support for offshore
wind that is given by the banding systems, the investment cost of OFFW is going to decrease.
In this section we will therefore analyze the effect of a small decrease in the unit investment cost
of OFFW of 0.42 to κ4 = 53.06. Assuming that operating and management costs remain the
same, this means a decrease of 32.5 per KW of installed capacity (which is approximately 1% of
the original building cost per KW).































Figure 8: Investment quantities in the UK banding system.
In Figures 8 and 9 the investment quantities in the UK and alternative banding systems,
respectively, are shown. Investment decisions in the original obligation system will be the same
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Figure 9: Investment quantities in the alternative banding system.
as in Figure 1. Comparing Figure 2 to Figure 8, it is obvious that a small decrease in the OFFW
investment cost can have quite an impact on investment strategies. In Figure 2 a target of 0.33
is needed for OFFW to come into the mixture, whereas with the lower investment cost a ϕ of
0.22 is sufficient. The same comparison can be done for Figures 3 and 9. In Figure 3 a ϕ of
0.41 is needed to induce investments in OFFW, whereas in Figure 9 a ϕ of 0.31 is sufficient.
Afterwards, investments in OFFW are increasing rapidly with ϕ, and ONW investments even go
to zero. Comparing Figure 8 to Figure 9 we observe that again the UK banding system needs
lower targets in order to induce investments in OFFW, but that for high levels of ϕ investments
in OFFW are not increasing as rapidly as is the case in the alternative system.
Figure 10 shows the average consumer prices after the cost reduction in OFFW. In the no
banding and UK banding systems we observe nearly the same average prices as those observed
in Figure 5. In the no banding system this is not surprising as OFFW is not in the mixture.
In the UK banding system for high levels of ϕ there is more OFFW in the mixture than before
the cost reduction. This additional OFFW does not influence the average consumer price. The
consumer price consists of pN , the price nonrenewable generators receive, which is independent
of OFFW investment cost, plus ϕν, the mark-up. As ν is not influenced by the amount of OFFW
in the mixture, the consumer price is not affected by a different mixture either. Obviously, in
the alternative banding system OFFW does affect the average consumer price. Although the
reward per certificate remains the same, the number of certificates significantly increases with
the amount of OFFW investments. To cover the expenses of the increased number of certificates,
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Figure 10: The average consumer price.
consumer prices increase. We may conclude that in the alternative banding system consumers
pay for the additional financial support that is given to OFFW. A reduction in OFFW investment
cost can thus lead to a higher average consumer price.






































Figure 11: The renewable production as a fraction of total production.
Figures 11 and 12 contain the fraction of renewable production and the expected CO2 emis-
sions, respectively. It can be seen that in the no banding and alternative banding system the
obligation target is satisfied, and that CO2 emissions are nearly the same. This was also observed
in Figures 6 and 7. Hence, while prices are relatively stable in the UK banding system, emissions
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Figure 12: The average CO2 emissions.
are relatively stable in the original obligation and alternative banding system. In the UK banding
system, the fraction of renewable production and the expected CO2 emissions are affected by the
cost reduction. As can be seen from Figure 11, for ϕ ≥ 0.35 the obligation target is not satisfied,
while it was satisfied up to ϕ = 0.44 before the cost reduction. Also, when comparing Figures 7
and 12 we see that the cost reduction leads to more emissions for ϕ ≥ 0.22. The different mixture
as a result of the OFFW cost reduction thus results in a more polluting system. Obviously this
is a negative side effect of having the target on certificates, while OFFW receives 2 certificates
per unit production when only producing a single unit of renewable electricity. Calculation B
could potentially improve the situation as it would put a higher target on certificates, but one
should at least be cautious about the possible side effects of an obligation on certificates.
To summarize, when a technology with a high banding manages to reduce its cost, banding
mechanisms may cause unwanted side effects. In the UK banding system a cost reduction in
OFFW may lead to increased levels of CO2 emission, whereas in the alternative system it may
lead to increased consumer prices. A possible solution when OFFW costs are reduced, is reducing
its banding coefficient accordingly.
7 Conclusions
This paper modeled and analyzed three different renewable obligation policies in a mathematical
framework. The original (UK) renewable obligation, the renewable obligation including the UK
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banding system, and a proposal for an alternative banding system have been modeled in the
electricity market investment model that was originally introduced by Gürkan et al. (2012).
Then a numerical study shed some light on the possible advantages and disadvantages of each
system and we have observed a couple of side effects.
The main goal of the renewable obligation is to reduce CO2 emissions by reducing investments
in polluting technologies and to have them replaced by renewable ones. As we observed in our
numerical study, CO2 emissions are curbed both directly by the replacement of coal by onshore
wind, and indirectly by the replacement of coal by the cleaner CCGT. While we see an increasing
investment in onshore wind and to a lesser extent landfill gas, a major concern is that in the
long term targets may not be met without investment in less developed technologies like offshore
wind. As can also be observed in our numerical study, the renewable obligation fails to give the
right financial incentives to these less developed technologies. This is the main reason why a
banding system was introduced in the UK in 2009. Rather than rewarding each unit production
with a renewable resource with the same amount of certificates, more certificates and hence more
support is given to the technologies that needed additional incentives.
We find that the banding system can be successful in giving incentives to OFFW, but that
rather high targets are needed in order to do so. Once there is a substantial amount of investment
in OFFW, we observe that the original obligation target on production may not be met. This is
caused by the fact that a unit production with OFFW adds two units to satisfying the obligation
target whereas it only adds one unit of renewable energy. This problem may be magnified when
less developed technologies like tidal and wave power enter the optimal mixture. They need more
support as stressed out by Allan et al. (2011), and therefore they have banding coefficients of 3
and 5, respectively.
We then proposed an alternative banding system, which guarantees that the original obligation
target on production is always satisfied. On the downside, based on our numerical study it is
expected that in the alternative system prices will significantly rise and that even higher targets
are needed in order to give incentives for investment in tidal and wave power.
It is expected that more support for OFFW is going to cause more development in OFFW and
hence will result in a downward shift in OFFW investment cost in the long run. We analyzed the
consequences of such a cost decrease and found that investment levels in different technologies
are in general very sensitive. Since more OFFW comes into the optimal technology mixture,
less investment in renewable technologies is needed to satisfy the obligation in the UK banding
system. Therefore we find that a cost decrease in OFFW actually results in more CO2 emissions.
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We do not observe this in the alternative banding system, but there the prices are very sensitive
to changes in cost and we find a significant increase in the consumer price. Obviously, bandings,
besides its positive effects on less established technologies, can have certain negative side effects
and can give the wrong message in the long run. When technologies succeed in reducing its cost as
a result of the given support (learn by doing), the financial support should be reduced accordingly.
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